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INTRODUCTION
Congress extended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in
1972, barring public employers from discriminating against
employees and potential employees.1 At the time, it noted a
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR) report that singled
out police and fire departments for imposing barriers greater
than any other area of state or local government.2 Blacks
held almost no positions in the officer ranks.3
The fire department in New Haven, Connecticut,
exemplified the report’s concerns.4 New Haven staffed one
black lieutenant out of sixty-one, and not a single black
captain or higher officer.5 The Firebird Society of New

1. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 80
Stat. 662 (amending Title VII § 701(a) to include “governments, governmental
agencies, [and] political subdivisions”) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a) (2010)).
2. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 16 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2137, 2153, 1971 WL 11301 (“The problem of employment discrimination is
particularly acute and has the most deleterious effect in these governmental
activities which are most visible to the minority communities (notably
education, law enforcement, and administration of justice) with the result that
the credibility of the government’s claim to represent all the people equally is
negated.”).
The original Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribed disparate
treatment—workplace discrimination on the basis of an individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub.L. 88-352,
78 Stat. 241, § 703(k) (emphasis added) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(2010)).
3. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 16 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2137, 2153, 1971 WL 11301.
4. See Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci III), 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2691 (2009)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
5. Firebird Soc. of New Haven, Inc. v. New Haven Bd. of Fire Comm’rs, 66
F.R.D. 457, 460 (D. Conn. 1975).

PAKPOUR FINAL

2012]

9/5/2012 10:42:32 AM

STANDARDIZING DISPARATE IMPACT

1113

Haven, an organization composed of all the black firemen in
the department, filed a civil rights action in 1973 challenging,
among other things, written examinations with a racially
disproportionate impact.6 The city eventually settled with the
firefighters, agreeing to take corrective measures designed to
ameliorate the disparate impact of its hiring practices.7 And
Congress in 1991 codified “disparate impact” as an explicit
claim under Title VII section 703.8
Thirty years after Firebird, the situation in New Haven
had changed, but not extensively.9
So when the city
discovered that its 2003 promotional exam would promote no
black applicants, it refused to certify the results.10 This
meant the city would deny promotions to the white
firefighters who passed the exam. Certain white firefighters
responded in 2004 by suing the city, claiming that steps
taken by the department to prevent further discriminatory
effects of its selection procedures resulted in reverse
discrimination.11 In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed
with them in Ricci v. DeStefano, granting the seventeen white
firefighters (and one Hispanic) summary judgment.12 The
Court held that New Haven should have certified results of
the standardized promotional exam, regardless of its racially
disparate impact.13 Throwing out the results would be
justified only where the city had a “strong basis in evidence”
it would lose against a hypothetical claim of such impact.14
Pre-employment and promotional testing shapes the way
American employers hire and promote “qualified, successful,
and performance-driven employees.”15 But study after study
6. Id. at 459.
7. See id. at 463.
8. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat 1071,
1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2010)).
9. Ricci III, 129 S. Ct. at 2691 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Despite
blacks and Hispanics comprising 60% of the city’s population in 2003, they
made up only 18% of the officer ranks. Id. Further, only one out of twenty-one
captains was black. Id.
10. See id. at 2664 (majority opinion).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2681.
13. See id. at 2677.
14. See id. (“The racial adverse impact here was significant, and petitioners
do not dispute that the [city] was faced with a prima facie case of disparateimpact liability.”).
15. Martin Carrigan, Pre-Employment Testing – Prediction of Employee
Success and Legal Issues: A Revisitation of Griggs v. Duke Power, 5 J. BUS. &
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demonstrates that minorities in general, and blacks in
particular, perform measurably worse on these exams than
their white peers.16 Therefore, closing any racial divide in
employment existing today requires either new testing
procedures, modified analysis of the tests already in use, or
throwing out standardized tests altogether, since enforcing
results posing a racially disparate impact exacerbates the
racial divide.17
Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court have ruled out
tests that result in a racially disparate effect. For example, a
unanimous Supreme Court ruled in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
against the use of tests “neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent,” if they operate to freeze the status
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.18 When
the Court subsequently lowered this standard in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio,19 Congress reacted by passing the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, instructing the Court in so many words
that it preferred the use of the Griggs standard when
adjudicating Title VII cases.20 Commentators already accept
the Ricci decision as another swipe by the Court at Title VII
disparate impact, foreshadowing the day when the Court may
ultimately rule it unconstitutional.21 Justice Scalia hinted as
much in his short concurrence to the Ricci opinion.22 That is
ECON. RES. 35, 42 (2007).
16. See Paul Sackett, et al., High-Stakes Testing in Higher Education and
Employment, 63 AM. PSYCHOL. 215, 222 (2008).
17. See infra Part VI.A.
18. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971).
19. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659–60 (1989)
(lowering the standards of review for such employment practices); see also infra
Part I.D.
20. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat 1071,
1071 (1991) (“The purposes of this Act . . . [include] codify[ing] the concepts . . .
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs [] . . . and in the other Supreme
Court decisions prior to Wards Cove . . . .”).
21. See Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV.
1341, 1342–43 (2010) (pointing out that, while the Court dodged a bullet by
deciding the case on statutory rather than equal protection grounds, that
gesture merely concealed the deeper issue: whether Title VII’s disparate impact
doctrine can be consistent with equal protection in the wake of the Court’s
previous decisions).
22. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci III), 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681–82 (2009) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion but write separately to observe that its
resolution of this dispute merely postpones the evil day on which the Court will
have to confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the disparateimpact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 consistent with the
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why Congress needs to act.
Congress should amend Title VII, making it an unlawful
employment practice to certify the results of tests causing
disparate impacts when those results reasonably follow from
the discriminatory effects of the creation or administration of
the exams, or the employer is aware, or should be aware, of a
reasonable alternative to the tests that produce fewer
disparate results.23
Part I of this Comment will introduce the background of
Title VII, its previous amendments, and the Court’s
application of it.24 Part II will describe the racial disparity of
employment test results.25 Part III will brief the facts of
Ricci, with special emphasis on the New Haven Fire
Department’s promotional exams, as well as the district
court’s holding for the city and the Second Circuit’s
affirmance.26 Part IV will assess the Supreme Court’s holding
of the case, with attention paid to the credence given the
disparate impact of the promotional exams.27 Part V will
describe the precise problem that results from the Supreme
Court’s rationale applied to pre-employment testing, and the
consequences of Congressional inaction.28
Part VI will
summarize the research demonstrating the traditional
adverse impact of employment exams on ethnic minorities,
the primary causes of these results, and one widely accepted
alternative.29
Finally, Part VII identifies a legislative
amendment to Title VII that will hopefully save disparate
impact from a Supreme Court motivated to circumvent the
Civil Rights Act by forcing employers to accept results of
facially neutral, yet racially discriminatory employment
tests.30

Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection?”).
23. See infra Part V (explaining the proposed statutory amendment).
24. See infra Part I.
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. See infra Part V.
29. See infra Part VI.
30. See infra Part VII.
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I. BACKGROUND OF TITLE VII
A. The Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1972
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, ratified in 1964,
prohibits employers from failing or refusing to hire or
discharging individuals because of their race.31 Congress
extended this “disparate treatment” provision of Title VII in
1972 to cover public employment.32 At the time, municipal
fire departments across the country pervasively discriminated
against minorities.33 Moreover, a U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights (USCCR) report singled out police and fire
departments for imposing barriers greater than any other
area of state or local government, with blacks holding almost
no positions in the officer ranks.34 While overt racism was
partly to blame, so too was reliance on criteria unrelated to
job performance when making hiring and promotion
decisions.35
B. Court Develops the Griggs36 Standard
The Supreme Court considered the intention of Congress
when passing the Civil Rights Act to be clear from the “plain
language of the statute,”37 unanimously holding in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. that Duke Power’s standardized employment
tests did not comport with Congress’ “inescapable” intent that
standardized exams be job related.38 Therefore, an employer
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2010). Specifically, the statute makes it illegal
to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin,” or “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” See also Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(1–2), 78
Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2010)).
32. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 80
Stat. 662 (amending § 701(a) to include “governments, governmental agencies,
[and] political subdivisions”) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (2010)).
33. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci III), 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2690 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
34. Id. at 2690–91; see also supra note 3.
35. Id. at 2690.
36. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
37. Id. at 429.
38. Id. at 436
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could not give those tests “controlling force” over its hiring
and promoting decisions without violating Title VII.39
Plaintiffs had challenged Duke Power’s company policy that
applicants for positions other than those in the labor
department be high school graduates and score satisfactorily
on two professionally prepared aptitude tests.40 Neither test
measured the ability to learn to perform a particular job or
category of jobs.41 At the time, evidence demonstrated that
blacks performed far worse on these exams than whites.42
Further, the 1960 census results showed that, while 34% of
white males had completed high school, only 12% of blacks
had in North Carolina, where Duke Power was located.43
While each individual took the same test for the same
job, the Court understood Title VII as proscribing “not only
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation.”44 The “touchstone” of this
analysis is “business necessity.”45 In other words, Title VII
prohibits any employment practice operating to exclude
minorities, unless employers demonstrate it relates to job
performance.46
Clarifying the Griggs standard, the Court in Albermarle
Paper Co. v. Moody ruled that Title VII forbids the use of
employment tests that are discriminatory in effect unless the
employer shows that any given requirement signifies a
manifest relationship to the employment in question.47 Once
the employer does this, the complaining party can still prevail
by showing that other tests or selection devices would also
serve the employer’s legitimate interest in “efficient and
trustworthy workmanship,” yet without the undesirable
racial effect.48

39. Id.
40. Id. at 427–28.
41. Id. at 428.
42. Id. at 430.
43. Id. at 426, 430 n.6.
44. Id. at 431.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 431.
47. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
48. Id. at 425; see also McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
801–02 (1973) (establishing the burden shifting framework for discrimination
cases).
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C. EEOC Publishes Uniform Guidelines for Employers
Following the direction of Congress and the Court, the
five government agencies having the primary responsibility
for enforcing federal employment laws like Title VII,
including the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), issued the “Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures,”49 which became effective on September
25, 1978.50 The agencies adopted the guidelines to provide a
uniform set of principles governing use of employee selection
procedures “consistent with applicable legal standards.”51
The guidelines stand for the principle “adopted by the
Supreme Court” in Griggs and ratified by Congress in the
1972 amendment to Title VII that, “a selection process which
has an adverse impact on the employment opportunities of
members of a race . . . and thus disproportionately screens
them out is unlawfully discriminatory.”52
The Uniform Guidelines harmonize the use of
standardized testing with the goals of Title VII.53 For
example, under the Guidelines, “any selection procedure
which has an adverse impact on the hiring, promotion, or
other employment or membership opportunities of members
of any race . . . will be considered to be discriminatory and
inconsistent with” the guidelines, save for some exceptions.54
In addition, where two or more selection procedures are
available which serve the employer’s legitimate interest and
are substantially equally valid for a given purpose, the
employer “should use the procedure which has been
demonstrated to have the lesser adverse impact.”55 Finally,
whenever the employer is made aware that an alternative
selection procedure with evidence of less adverse impact and

49. Adoption of Questions and Answers to Clarify and Provide a Common
Interpretation of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 44
Fed. Reg. 11,996 (Mar. 2, 1979) [hereinafter Q&A]; see also Uniform Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1 (2010). The Office of
Personnel Management, Department of Justice, Department of Labor, and
Department of Treasury made up the rest of the agencies responsible for
enforcing employment laws. See Q&A, 44 Fed. Reg. at 11,996.
50. Q&A, supra note 49, at 11,996.
51. Q&A, supra note 49, at 11,997.
52. Q&A, supra note 49, at 11,997 (emphasis added).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 54–56.
54. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3(A).
55. Id. § 1607.3(B).
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substantial evidence of validity for the same job in similar
circumstances exists, it should investigate it to determine the
appropriateness of using it.56
D. Wards Cove:57 Court Moves in a New Direction
Despite the obvious direction in which Congress aimed,
the Court moved in an entirely different one in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, ruling by a five-to-four majority to alter
some of the standards established by Griggs.58 Whereas,
before, employers had the burden of persuading the court that
a practice that disproportionately excluded members of a
minority group was a business necessity,59 the Wards Cove
Court ruled employers had merely the burden of production.60
Also, rather than demonstrating that the challenged practice
had a “manifest relationship to the employment in
question,”61 Wards Cove permits such practices so long as
they serve “in a significant way, the legitimate employment
goals of the employer.”62 Further, the touchstone of the
inquiry was no longer business necessity,63 but “a reasoned
review of the employer’s justification for his use of the
challenged practice.”64 The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
decision for the plaintiffs and remanded the case to the
District Court for a ruling based on its new standard.65
E. Congress Responds: The Civil Rights Act of 1991
Congress responded to the Wards Cove decision almost
immediately, passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to “improve
Federal civil rights laws,” and “to clarify provisions regarding
disparate impact actions,” among other purposes.66 Finding
56. Id.
57. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
58. See id. at 650 (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s application of the Griggs
standard).
59. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
60. Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 659–60.
61. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
62. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
63. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (emphasis added).
64. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 661. See Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., CS-74-145-JLQ,
1991 WL 67529 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 23, 1991) aff’d in part, vacated in part, 10
F.3d 1485–86 (9th Cir. 1993).
66. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat 1071,
1071 (1991) (emphasis added) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2010)).
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that Wards Cove “has weakened the scope and effectiveness of
Federal civil rights protections,”67 Congress aimed to “codify
the concepts of ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’ ”
enunciated by the Court in Griggs “and in the other Supreme
Court decisions prior to Wards Cove.”68 To that end, Congress
added “disparate impact” as an explicit claim under Title VII
section 703.69 Under the new law, plaintiffs may show
discrimination by demonstrating an employer utilizes a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate
impact and is unrelated to the position in question.70
Additionally, a plaintiff can show disparate impact by
demonstrating an alternative employment practice the
employer refuses to adopt.71 Such demonstration shall be in
accordance with the law “as it existed on June 4, 1989,” the
day before the Wards Cove decision.72 The obvious intent of
Congress therefore was to make perfectly clear its preference
for the Griggs approach to Title VII claims over that of Wards
Cove.
One intention of Congress that the Court understood,
even before the enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, was
that employers should proactively take measures to comply
with the statute.73 The Uniform Guidelines set forth by the
EEOC explicitly state that, “Congress strongly encouraged
employers . . . to act on a voluntary basis to modify
67. See id. § 2.
68. See id. § 3.
69. See id. § 105; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2010).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2010) (emphasis added). Specifically, the
statute says, “An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this subchapter only if . . . a complaining party demonstrates
that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and
the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” Id.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2010).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) (2010). The Court decided Wards Cove on
June 5, 1989. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
73. See, e.g., Local No. 93, Intern. Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,
478 U.S. 501, 515 (1986) (“We have on numerous occasions recognized that
Congress intended voluntary compliance to be the preferred means of achieving
the objectives of Title VII.”); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–
418 (1975) (quoting United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379
(8th Cir. 1973)) (Title VII sanctions intended to cause employers “to selfexamine and self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to
eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious
page in this country’s history.”).
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employment practices and systems which constituted barriers
to equal employment opportunity, without awaiting litigation
or formal government action.”74 For example, when the Santa
Clara County Transit District Board of Supervisors adopted a
hiring plan that authorized managers to consider as one
factor the sex of a qualified applicant in making promotions
to positions within a traditionally segregated job classification
in which women had been significantly underrepresented,75
the Court upheld the plan.76
As a result of employers taking proactive steps to avoid
disparate impact claims, the number of so-called reverse
discrimination suits has risen.77
But federal trial and
appellate courts have dealt with such suits by upholding the
purpose of Title VII.78 For example, White and Latino
applicants to the police department brought a Title VII class
action lawsuit against the County of Nassau in New York
State for redesigning its entrance exam to minimize the
discriminatory impact on minority candidates.79 The Second
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claim
because there was no evidence the county intended to
discriminate against any one class, a prerequisite for a
disparate treatment claim.80 The court also rejected the
plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim because they could not show
the exam fell “more harshly upon them,” a prerequisite for a
disparate impact claim.81
While the county expressly
admitted it redesigned the test to diminish the adverse
impact on black applicants, that desire “in and of itself” did
not constitute evidence of discrimination.82 It would be a
mistake to treat “racial motive as a synonym for a

74. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §
1608.1(b) (2010).
75. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 620–21 (1987).
76. Id. at 642. “[V]oluntary employer action can play a crucial role in
furthering Title VII’s purpose of eliminating the effects of discrimination in the
workplace, and . . . Title VII should not be read to thwart such efforts.” Id. at
630.
77. See Does Affirmative Action Punish Whites?, MSNBC.COM (Apr. 28,
2009, 7:19:29 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30462129/ns/us_news-life; see
also 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(a).
78. See infra text accompanying notes 79–83.
79. See Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 51–52 (2d Cir. 1999).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 48.
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constitutional violation.”83
The Tenth Circuit rejected a similar Title VII claim by
white male police officers, who complained that the police
department’s expansion of those eligible to participate in an
oral examination—which resulted in the addition of one
Hispanic male, one Hispanic female, one Native American
female, and three white males to the list of those eligible for
promotion—discriminated against the plaintiffs on the basis
of race.84 The department generated the “Promotional List”
using a two-stage competition among eligible officers: a
written exam and an oral “Assessment Center” exam.85 Only
those employees who achieved a certain score on the written
exam advanced to the Assessment Center portion.86 The
complaining officers qualified for the Assessment Center
stage regardless of whether the department expanded the
eligibility list or not.87 However, due to their Assessment
Center scores, they failed to make the Promotional List.88
The Tenth Circuit ruled that, assuming the department
expanded the eligibility list solely because it wanted to
include more women and minorities in the next stage,
plaintiffs could not demonstrate denial of the opportunity to
compete on an equal footing with minority candidates.89
The circuit courts have thus protected employers from
disparate treatment claims when they took reasonable steps
to ensure all applicants competed on a level playing field. In
deciding Ricci, the Supreme Court continued to recognize
voluntary compliance as “the preferred means of achieving
the objectives of Title VII.”90 However, mere “good faith” fear
of disparate impact liability will no longer be enough to
justify such voluntary compliance if it violates the disparate
treatment provision of Title VII.91

83. Id. at 49 (referring to plaintiffs’ additional equal protection claim).
84. Byers v. City of Albuquerque, 150 F.3d 1271, 1272–73 (10th Cir. 1998).
85. Id. at 1273.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1277 (affirming the district court’s granting of summary judgment
for the city).
90. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci III), 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674 (2009) (quoting Local
No. 93, Intern. Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 515
(1986)).
91. Id. at 2675.
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II. THE RACIALLY DISPARATE IMPACT OF STANDARDIZED
EXAMS
While in existence now for nearly a century, standardized
pre-employment testing experienced a huge spurt during
World War II, as the U.S. military administered cognitive
ability and intelligence testing when selecting personnel.92
While the Civil Rights Act and the publishing of the Uniform
Guidelines in the 1970s shed some doubt on the validity of
pre-employment testing, by the late 1980s and 1990s, preemployment testing had made a comeback.93 That is because
these tests are widely believed to be among the most valid
predictors of job performance, regardless of the fact that they
are associated with large performance differences between
blacks and whites, as well as employers hiring
proportionately fewer blacks than whites.94 The consequences
of these policies leave individuals in certain ethnic groups
with markedly lower levels of access to better employment
opportunities.95
It is generally accepted across disciplines to expect a 1.0
standard deviation between black and white performance on
standardized testing, no matter the discipline (i.e., education,
military, employment, etc.).96 Without delving deeper into an
examination of standard deviations, an employer planning to
hire 25% of those passing a test resulting in a 1.0 standard
deviation between whites and blacks might expect to hire or
promote approximately 4.7% of the black applicants.97
Compare that with a standard deviation of 0.9 and the same
hiring ratio might result in a projected minority
hiring/promotion rate of 5.8% of black applicants.98 Thus, the
lower the standard deviation between races, the greater the
likelihood such a selection method will produce a diverse
workforce.
92. Carrigan, supra note 15, at 35, 37.
93. Id. at 37.
94. Philip L. Roth et. al., Ethnic Group Differences in Cognitive Ability in
Employment and Educational Settings: A Metaanalysis, 54 PERSONNEL
PSYCHOL. 297, 298 (2001).
95. Id. at 298.
96. The standard deviation for blacks is 0.99, 1.02, 1.34, 1.10, and 0.99 for
the SAT, ACT, GRE, military tests and employment tests respectively. Sackett,
supra note 16, at 222.
97. Roth, supra note 94, at 300.
98. Id.
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The effects of the standard deviation played a
pronounced role in Ricci, where the fire department invited
22% of those applying for the captain position to interview.99
Twenty percent of those testing to become captain were black;
however only 1% passed and none of them were ultimately
selected to interview.100 The fire department invited 13%
percent of those applying for the lieutenant promotion to
interview.101 Twenty-five percent of those testing to become
lieutenant were black, however less than 1% passed and none
were invited to interview.102
III. BACKGROUND OF RICCI V. DESTEFANO
A. The Dispute
In suing the city and those responsible for refusing to
certify the 2003 fire department promotional test results,
seventeen white candidates and one Hispanic candidate
claimed the defendants intentionally discriminated against
them in favor of nonwhite candidates because of political
pressure exerted by the mayor, thereby violating Title VII’s
disparate treatment provision.103 Defendants replied they
only desired to avoid violating Title VII’s disparate impact
provision and comply with the spirit of that law.104
B. Administering the Exam
In 2003, the New Haven Fire Department administered
written and oral examinations for promotion to Lieutenant
and Captain.105 Forty-one applicants took the Captain’s

99. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145 (D. Conn. 2006).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 150–51.
104. Id. at 152–53.
105. Id. at 145. The city contracted with I/O Solutions (IOS), a company that
specializes in these kinds of exams, to design the test. Id. The company first
interviewed a random sample of current New Haven Fire Department
Lieutenants, Captains, and Battalion Chiefs to determine the basic information
concerning the structure of the department, the tasks required of individuals at
each rank, and the materials the department generally utilizes for training. Id.
at 147. Based on those interviews, IOS developed a written “job analysis
questionnaire” (JAQ) that asked all incumbents in the positions for Lieutenant
and Captain “to provide information about how important they feel a specific
task, knowledge area, skill or ability is . . . . ” Id. The JAQ asked how
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exam, of whom twenty-five were white, eight black, and eight
Hispanic.106 Twenty-two of the applicants passed, of whom
sixteen were white, three black, and three Hispanic.107
However, because only nine individuals would be considered
for the seven vacancies the city needed to fill, and the top
nine scores came from seven whites and two Hispanics, the
Fire Department did not consider any blacks for a captain
position.108
Seventy-seven applicants took the Lieutenant’s exam, of
whom forty-three were white, nineteen black, and fifteen
Hispanic.109 Thirty-four passed, of whom twenty-five were
white, six black and three Hispanic.110 However, because only
ten individuals would be considered for the eight lieutenant
vacancies the city needed to fill, and the top ten scores came
from ten whites, the Fire Department did not consider any
blacks or Hispanics for promotion.111
C. New Haven Assesses the Results
New Haven’s Civil Service Board (CSB) held several
hearings in 2004 before deciding whether to certify the
results of the exam.112 Alarmed by the results, the city’s
Corporate Counsel Thomas Ude characterized them to the
CSB as demonstrating “a very significant disparate impact
. . . .”113 He later testified that the results of previous exams
in the department and in other departments had not
produced this level of disparity, making these results
important each task was to successful performance on the job and how
frequently it was necessary to perform it. Id. The importance and frequency of
a task were merged into a metric called “criticality or essentiality.” Id. Tasks
above a certain threshold in this metric were designated for testing on the
written and oral portions of the exam. Id. Upon completion, the test was
assessed by two “independent reviewers,” neither of whom worked in the state.
Id.
106. Id. at 145.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 145.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 145. Interpreting the disparate impact statute for the CSB, Ude
informed the board that, even if they believed the test was job-related, it could
still be rejected if it had a disparate impact on a minorities and less
discriminatory alternatives for selecting candidates for promotion existed. Id.
at 145–46.
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“different” from results in the past.114
While none of the firefighters knew where they placed on
the exam, several testified before the CSB in favor and
against certifying the results.115 Frank Ricci, the plaintiff in
the subsequence case, spoke in favor of certifying the results,
arguing that he studied eight to thirteen hours a day to
prepare for the exam, incurring over $1000 in costs, including
purchasing the books and paying an acquaintance to read
them onto tape because he is dyslexic and learns better by
listening.116 Another firefighter argued the test was fair since
every question on it came from the materials applicants were
instructed to study.117 Several firefighters argued against
certifying the results, some on the ground that the questions
“were not relevant to knowledge or skills necessary for the
positions.”118
Another firefighter mentioned the study
materials were difficult to obtain.119
Donald Day, a representative of the Northeast Region of
the International Association of Black Professional
Firefighters, argued against certification on several
grounds.120 First, black and Hispanic firefighters ranked
sufficiently high to have a realistic opportunity for promotion
on previous promotional examinations in 1996 and 1999.121
Day also compared New Haven’s results with that of
Bridgeport, Connecticut’s department, which had more
diversity in its ranks.122
Attempting to understand whether the test itself was
flawed, the CSB heard testimony from Christopher Hornick,
Ph.D., who runs a consulting business that competes with the
company the city hired to generate the exam.123 While not
referring to the test itself, Hornick testified that the results of
114. Id. at 150.
115. Id. at 146.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. For example, one question asked whether to park a fire truck facing
“uptown” or “downtown,” terms that have no reference in New Haven. Id.
119. Id. The only books that fire houses kept on hand were the “Essentials to
Fire Fighting” series, not the books included on the syllabus to be studied for
the exam. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (referring specifically to the fact Bridgeport weighed the written
portion of the exam significantly less than New Haven, 30% rather than 60%).
123. Id. at 148.
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the exam exhibited “relatively high adverse impact.”124 He
also told the committee that his company finds “significantly
and dramatically less adverse impact” in most of the tests he
designs.125 While whites normally outperform nonwhites on
the majority of standardized testing procedures,126 the degree
of adverse impact resulting from the New Haven tests
“surprised” Hornick.127
When pressed to explain the
disparity, Hornick referred to several characteristics of the
exam that combined to produce the disparity.128 First, New
Haven depended far more on the written portion of the exam
than other departments.129 He also pointed to the fact that no
one within the New Haven Fire Department reviewed the
test, which typically results in questions that have scant
relevance to the specific department tested.130 Yet, Hornick
suggested the CSB should certify the results anyway.131
Hornick also testified about alternatives to the exam New
Haven employed.132 One alternative is an “assessment center
process,” which is essentially an opportunity for candidates to
demonstrate their knowledge of standard operating
procedures, and how they would address a particular problem
rather than verbally regurgitating it on a written exam.133
Hornick testified that such “situation judgment tests,” once
customized to particular organizations, “demonstrate
dramatically less adverse impacts.”134 Such an approach has
been endorsed in the past by the Tenth Circuit.135
Finally, Dr. Janet Helms, a professor of counseling
psychology and director of the Institute for the Study and
Promotion of Race and Culture at Boston College, testified
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. Vincent Lewis, a Fire Program Specialist for the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, and a retired firefighter from Michigan, also testified to the
CSB that, while the test asked relevant questions and he would not change a
thing, the disparate impact was probably the result of a “general pattern that
usually whites outperform [nonwhites] on testing.” Id. at 149.
127. Id. at 148.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 148–49.
131. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci III), 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2680 (2009).
132. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 149.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Byers v. City of Albuquerque, 150 F.3d 1271, 1273 (10th Cir. 1998);
supra Part I.E.
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generally about the differences in performance on
standardized tests between whites and nonwhites.136
According to Helms, experts know “for a fact” that, regardless
of what kind of written test given in this country, they can
just about predict how many people will pass who are
members of “underrepresented groups.”137 In fact, the results
in New Haven’s case were indicative of those predictions.138
As for New Haven’s test, Helms suggested one problem might
be that 67% of the respondents in the survey that determined
which questions were relevant to the job were white, so the
questions ultimately chosen may have skewed toward their
job knowledge as “most of the literature on firefighters show
that the different [racial and gender] groups perform the job
differently.”139 Another reason for the difference could have
resulted from disparities in opportunities for training and
“informal mentoring” available to minorities.140
Helms
testified that minority test takers often score lower because
they are not expected to perform well.141 She also mentioned
that minority test takers often deviate from the traditional
methods of performing tasks.142 Finally, Helms believed that
socioeconomic disparity infected the scores, most likely a
result of requiring costly books to prepare for the exam.143
D. District Court Grants Summary Judgment for City
Applying the McDonnell Douglas three-prong burdenshifting framework,144 District Court Judge Janet Bond
136. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 149.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Under
that test, plaintiffs first must establish a prima facie case of discrimination on
account of race. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 151. To do so, they must prove (1)
membership in a protected class, (2) qualification for the position, (3) an adverse
employment action, and (4) circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination on the basis of membership in the protected class. Id. at 151–52.
This proof thus shifts the burden to the defendant to produce evidence that the
plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Id. at 152.
“This burden is one of production, not persuasion.” Id. (quoting Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000)). “It involves no
credibility assessment.” Id. (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142). Defendant’s
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Arterton held that, since the city’s motivation when refusing
to certify the results was a “good faith” attempt to comply
with Title VII, it had no discriminatory intent, and thus the
plaintiffs could not prevail on their Title VII claim.145
Specifically, the District Court noted that the
department’s test resulted in textbook disparate impact,
citing the EEOC’s Uniform Guidelines.146
Under the
Guidelines’ “four-fifths rule,” a selection that yields “a
selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less
than four-fifths . . . of the rate for the group with the highest
rate will generally be regarded by the federal enforcement
agencies as evidence of adverse impact.”147 The four-fifths
result would have been only 48% on the lieutenant’s exam,
while on the captain’s exam it would have been even less,
both far below the 80% threshold imposed by the EEOC.148
E. Second Circuit Affirms District Court Decision
In what became the most discussed circuit court opinion
of 2008,149 the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s
burden is satisfied if the proffered evidence, “taken as true, would permit the
conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.”
Id. (quoting Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 2000)). If the
employer articulates a neutral reason for the plaintiff’s termination, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to show pretext, or that the employer’s proffered
explanation has no support. Id. at 152.
145. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 160 (granting defendant’s motion and denying
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment).
146. Id. at 153.
147. Id. (citing Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29
C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2010)).
148. Id. at 153–54.
149. U.S. President Barack Obama nominated Judge Sonia Sotomayor from
the Second Circuit to replace David Souter as Supreme Court Justice the year
after Sotomayor served as part of the per curiam opinion affirming the District
Court decision in Ricci. See, e.g., EDITORIAL: A Judge Too Far; Nominating
Sotomayor reveals the president’s true colors, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, May 27,
2009,
at
A18,
available
at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2009/may/27/a-judge-too-far/ (“The Supreme Court is expected to rule on Ricci v.
DeStefano before the Senate votes on Judge Sotomayor’s nomination. It would
be an extraordinary rebuke were a current nominee to be overruled on such a
controversial case by the very justices she is slated to join.”). Conservative
members of the media and the U.S. Senate later used the fact the decision was
reversed by the Supreme Court as evidence Judge Sotomayor was too extreme
for a Supreme Court appointment, typically without mentioning the fact the
case was reversed by a mere 5-4 margin. See, e.g., Sarah Pavlus, Conservative
Media Claim Supreme Court Decided Ricci “9-0” against Sotomayor, MEDIA
MATTERS
FOR
AMERICA
(June
29,
2009,
7:55
pm),
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“well reasoned” opinion.150 More specifically, the Second
Circuit ruled that, because the CSB was merely trying to
fulfill its Title VII obligations when “confronted” with test
results showing a disproportionate racial impact, its actions
were justified.151
IV. SUPREME COURT: EMPLOYER’S GOOD FAITH BELIEF IT
WOULD SUFFER LITIGIOUS CONSEQUENCES NOT ENOUGH TO
JUSTIFY TOSSING TEST RESULTS FOR ALL
A. Reverses District Court Holding for City
Reversing the Second Circuit’s decision, the Supreme
Court held that once the process by which promotions will be
made has been established and employers have made their
selection criteria clear, they may not then invalidate the test
results absent “a strong basis in evidence” of an
impermissible disparate impact.152
Unlike the district court, the Supreme Court, per Justice
Kennedy writing for a five-to-four majority, rejected the city’s
contention that an employer’s “good-faith belief” that its
actions are necessary to comply with Title VII’s disparate
impact provision should be enough to justify “race-conscious
conduct.”153 Justice Kennedy foresaw a parade of horribles
resulting from such a principle, namely encouraging racebased action at the slightest hint of disparate impact, thereby
amounting to a “de facto quota system,” in which employers
discard test results with the intent of obtaining the “preferred
racial balance.”154

http://mediamatters.org/research/200906290036; Anita Sinha & Daniel
Farbman, Sotomayor, Ricci and the Preferential Treatment Myth,
COMMONDREAMS.ORG, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/07/17-5 (last
visited Feb. 25, 2012) (“Republican senators on the Judiciary Committee have
brought up the Ricci case everyday this week during Sotomayor’s confirmation
hearings, and called on Mr. Ricci to testify yesterday against Judge Sotomayor.
Their argument seems to be: Sotomayor has been a beneficiary of unfair
preference over [w]hite men like Mr. Ricci, and she will continue to prefer
people like her (i.e.[,] people of color) over [w]hites from her seat on the
Supreme Court.”).
150. Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
151. Id.
152. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci III), 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009).
153. Id. at 2674–75.
154. Id. at 2675.
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The Court also rejected Ricci’s contentions that avoiding
disparate impact lawsuits never justifies throwing out test
results, or that an employer must already be in violation of
Title VII in order take such an action.155
B. Reintroduces the Strong Basis in Evidence Standard
In determining a standard that “strikes a more
appropriate balance” between the city’s and Ricci’s
arguments, the Court settled on a “strong basis in evidence”
standard, borrowing from its Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection jurisprudence.156 The Court has held in equal
protection cases such as Wygant v. Jackon Board of
Education and Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., that certain
government actions to remedy past racial discrimination,
which are themselves based on race, are constitutional only
where there is a “strong basis in evidence” that the remedial
objectives are necessary.157 The majority ruled this standard
will limit an employer’s discretion to cases in which there is a
strong basis in evidence of disparate impact liability, while
allowing employers to act only where there is a provable,
actual violation.158
Title VII permits an employer who wants to consider,
before administering a test or practice, how to design that
test or practice in order to provide a fair opportunity for all
individuals, regardless of race.159
However, once the
promotion process has been established and employers have
made their selection criteria clear, they may not then
invalidate the test results absent a strong basis in evidence of
an impermissible disparate impact.160
The Court agreed with the district court that the city had
a prima facie case of disparate impact on its hands.161 The
Supreme Court held, however, that anyone who brought a
disparate impact claim in this case would not be able to prove
the exams were not job related and consistent with business

155. Id. at 2674.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2675 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
500 (1989)); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986).
158. Ricci III, 129 S. Ct. at 2676.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2677.
161. Id. at 2677–78.
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necessity, or that there existed an equally valid, less
discriminatory alternative that served the city’s needs but
that the city refused to adopt.162 In doing so, the Court gave
little, if any, credence to the testimony of Dr. Hornick
concerning the adverse impact of the results and how another
test might change that.163 It treated Dr. Helms’s testimony
about how the test may have been deficient with similar
disinterest.164
But “[t]he Supreme Court did not provide detailed
guidance as to how the strong basis in evidence standard
should be applied.”165 Since the Court’s Ricci decision, the
Second Circuit has taken the most explicit approach in
outlining the Court’s “strong basis in evidence” standard,
holding that a strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact
liability is “an objectively reasonable basis to fear such
liability.”166 Elaborating on this standard, the Second Circuit
held that the employer’s decision, evaluated at the time an
employer takes a race-conscious action, must rely “on real
evidence, not just subjective fear or speculation.”167 The court
will uphold such a decision so long as there exists “actual
proof of a prima facie case” of disparate impact, and
“objectively strong evidence of non-job-relatedness or a less
discriminatory alternative.”168
While the city’s demonstration of less discriminatory
alternatives was arguably not objectively strong, this
standard introduced by the Second Circuit appears nowhere
in the statute as written by Congress.169 Title VII requires an
162. Id. at 2678 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A), (C) (2010)).
163. Id. at 2680; see supra Part III.C.
164. See Ricci III, 129 S. Ct. at 2681; Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F.
Supp. 2d 142, 149 (D. Conn. 2006); supra Part III.C.
165. NAACP v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 707 F. Supp. 2d 520, 532–33
(D.N.J. 2010).
166. United States v. Brennan, No. 08-5171-CV(L), 2011 WL 1679850, at *37
(2d Cir. May 5, 2011) (emphasis in the original). The Second Circuit goes even
further than Ricci, holding the employer must also have a strong basis in
evidence that, at the remedial stage following a finding of liability, a court
would impose a remedy “equivalent to or broader than what the employer has
done voluntarily.” Id. at *34.
167. Id. at *37.
168. Id. (emphasis in the original).
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2010); see also NAACP, 707 F. Supp.
2d at 532–33 (applying the Ricci standard to job relatedness and business
necessity without adding the phrase “objectively strong” to the test); supra Part
I.E.
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employer, in response to a claim of disparate impact, only to
“demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for
the position in question and consistent with business
necessity.”170 Therefore, the “objectively strong” qualifier can
be supported only by the Supreme Court’s “strong basis in
evidence” standard, which itself is found nowhere in Title VII.

V. PROBLEM: REFUSING TO APPRECIATE THE DISPARATE
EFFECTS OF STANDARDIZED TESTING EXACERBATES THE
CONSEQUENCES
To understand why the city of New Haven could find the
tests it used unrelated to job performance, as well as why it
favored an alternative such as an assessment center
approach, one must fully appreciate the racial disparity
exhibited by standardized testing and how assessment
centers close the gap.171 The Supreme Court never fully
investigated this phenomenon once it dismissed Dr. Hornick’s
testimony concerning alternative approaches as tinged with a
competitive agenda,172 and Dr. Helms’ testimony tinged with
professional indifference, as she had not even analyzed the
test itself.173
Despite such a poor demonstration by the city, a more
thorough analysis of standardized testing calls for a different
approach than a “strong basis in evidence” standard,
especially in light of how these tests adversely impact racial
minorities as compared to viable alternatives. Ignoring the
racial disparity resulting from standardized employment
tests, the Court exacerbates the divide. Unless Congress acts,
170. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2010).
171. Indeed, the Supreme Court failed to do this in any substantive way.
However, neither did the city. While the city called several witnesses to testify
at its hearings considering whether to certify the results, the only witness
discussing an alternative approach ran a consulting business that competed
with the company hired by the city. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci III), 129 S. Ct.
2658, 2680 (2009). Further, the only witness discussing the statistical racial
disparity admitted before testifying she did not even look at the test itself. Id.
at 2681. Therefore, if the Supreme Court did not hit disparate impact out of the
park, it is not for lack of a proverbial softball lobbed to it by the New Haven
Civil Service Board.
172. Id. at 2680 (“Hornick’s primary concern-somewhat to the frustration of
CSB members-was marketing his services for the future, not commenting on the
results of the tests the City had already administered.”).
173. See id. at 2681.
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the consequences of racial disparity in test scores will
inevitably increase as generations of individuals within those
racial groups grow up in households in which it is more
challenging to obtain gainful employment.
VI. WHY WHITES OUTPERFORM MINORITIES ON
STANDARDIZED TESTS AND HOW ALTERNATIVES CAN AVOID
THE PROBLEM
A. Reasons for the Racial Disparity of Exam Results
There are several reasons minorities perform differently
on standardized tests.174
Preparing for and taking
However,
standardized tests begins in grade school.175
research demonstrates that two-thirds of black and 70% of
Hispanic schoolchildren attend what are in essence de facto
segregated schools.176
In fact, the percentage of black
children now enrolled in integrated public schools is at its
lowest level since 1968,177 and racial segregation in American
public schools is particularly pronounced in the northeast
(where New Haven is located) and midwest sections of the
country.178 Such segregation in schools is associated with
high levels of poverty which, in turn, are associated with poor
resources and decreased educational opportunities.179 As a
rule, the poorest schools are the ones with the highest
174. See infra Part VI.A.
175. Alfie Kohn, Standardized Testing and Its Victims, EDUC. WK., Sept. 27,
2000, at 60.
176. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 857 (E.D. Mich. 2001). By “de
facto segregation,” I mean that the schools have become or remain segregated
not as a result of laws facially designed to keep populations racially distinct, but
effectually so.
177. Sarah Karnasiewicz, Apartheid America: Jonathan Kozol Rails Against
a Public School System That, 50 Years After Brown v. Board of Education, is
Still Deeply – and Shamefully – Segregated, SALON.COM (Sept. 22, 2005, 12:22
AM), http://www.salon.com/life/feature/2005/09/22/kozol.
178. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 857. Segregation in the schools has been
shown to have a relationship with segregation in housing. See, e.g., Manny
Fernandez, Study Finds Disparities In Mortgages by Race, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17,
2007, at A20 (finding that home buyers in predominantly black and Hispanic
neighborhoods in New York City were more likely to get their mortgages in
2006 from a subprime lender, subjecting them to higher interest and penalties
than home buyers in white neighborhoods with similar income levels). Such
segregation is the result of several housing discrimination phenomena such as
“red lining,” in which banks discriminate against black applicants for mortgages
by denying access or increasing the costs. Id.
179. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 857.
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minority population.180 If de facto public school segregation
was the only factor working against them, minority
applicants for promotion in the New Haven Fire Department
would not be expected to perform well on the standardized
exams. But it is not. Further, such a factor would not
explain the disparity of results among black applicants from
integrated or relatively high quality schools.
There are other reasons. Dr. Helms alluded, in her
testimony to the CSB, that the questions for these exams are
typically written by white people and tested on them before
official use.181 Meanwhile, inner-city segregation has led to
the creation and use of a “Black English Vernacular,” making
it extremely difficult for blacks who use it regularly to easily
transition between standard English school work and books
to the Black-English Vernacular that they use in their homes
and with their friends.182 So long as employers use language
as a screening device for jobs, such as in standardized tests
written by whites using Standard American English, there
will be serious obstacles to minority applicants looking to
advance in the New Haven Fire Department and
elsewhere.183 While this might explain the score disparity for
many students, it still would not explain the disparity for
black students raised in homes or neighborhoods where they
do not speak using a different vernacular.
Various other reasons account for the test score disparity
that Dr. Helms referred to, such as the fact that mentoring
opportunities in organizations like fire departments are more
easily available to whites because whites already hold those
positions.184 Also, the differences between how whites and
blacks might perform a specific task would result in different
answers on an exam.185

180. Id.
181. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 156 (D. Conn. 2006)
(“[A]pproximately [two-thirds] of those interviewed [to assess the exam] were
white [which] could have unintentionally introduced a bias into the test
instrument.”).
182. Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 163–64 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1998).
183. Id. at 165.
184. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 149.
185. Id.
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But one phenomenon that has typified minority
performance on standardized exams, and one Dr. Helms
referred to in her testimony,186 is known as “stereotype
threat,” the impact of one’s consciousness of her race, gender,
etc., when taking a standardized exam on which she is not
expected to successfully perform.187 For example, research
conducted in the 1960s found that black participants
performed better on IQ tests when administrators presented
the exams as tests of eye-hand coordination rather than tests
of intelligence, since participants considered the former a
“nonevaluative” and thus a non-threatening test.188 A similar
test found that black students performed better on IQ tests
when they believed their performance would be compared to
other blacks as opposed to whites.189
Claude Steele coined the term “stereotype threat” in 1995
after conducting a study where he administered the Graduate
Record Examination (GRE) to white and black students.190
Researchers told one half of each racial group the test
measured “intellectual ability,” while telling the other half it
measured “problem-solving” tasks nondiagnostic of ability.191
The white students demonstrated no difference in
performance between the two groups, but blacks from the
“intelligence” group performed far worse than the other
group.192 The end result: stereotype threat conditions impair
standardized test performance among the people who are

186. Id. (“[T]est takers may score lower if they are expected not to perform
well . . . .”).
187. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the
Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 797, 797 (1995) (“Our reasoning is this: whenever African American
students perform an explicitly scholastic or intellectual task, they face the
threat of confirming or being judged by a negative societal stereotype—a
suspicion—about their group’s intellectual ability and competence. This threat
is not borne by people not stereotyped in this way. And the self-threat it
causes—through a variety of mechanisms—may interfere with the intellectual
functioning of these students, particularly during standardized tests.”).
188. Irwin Katz et al., Effects of Task Difficulty, Race of Administrator, and
Instructions on Digit-Symbol Performance of Negroes, 2 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 53, 53 (1965).
189. Irwin Katz, Effect upon Negro Digit Symbol Performance of Comparison
with Whites and with Other Negroes, 69 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 77, 77
(1964).
190. See Steele & Anderson, supra note 187, at 799.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 801.
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subject to negative stereotyping.193 This phenomenon would
explain racial disparity across cultural subgroups of one race
or gender since it relies not on one’s upbringing or
environment, but rather on one’s identity.194
B. Assessment Centers as an Alternative Approach
When New Haven considered whether to throw out its
2003 standardized test results, Dr. Hornick testified that “we
know that” written tests are not as valid as other
procedures.195 Besides the racial disparity of standardized
test results, there is also the real danger that departments
could place the wrong individuals into positions in which they
dictate the outcomes of significant life or death situations.196
Hornick suggested an “assessment center” as one example of
a test that would produce a less disparate impact.197 Fire
departments and police departments have turned to
alternatives such as assessment center testing because of a
history of hiring individuals that may perform well on
standardized tests but “couldn’t lead themselves out of [a]
building, let alone lead men and women toward
accomplishing organizational objectives.”198 An assessment
center is a testing process in which candidates participate in
a series of systematic, job related, real-life situations while
being observed and evaluated by experts in their field.199
Assessors observe candidates individually and in groups
performing exercises or scenarios that simulate conditions
and situations they would encounter in real life.200 For
example, one part of the El Paso Fire Department’s exam is
called the “Incident Scenario,” which examines one’s ability to
command and control an emergency scene.201 The applicant
193. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat Does Not Live by
Steele and Aronson (1995) Alone, 59 AM. PSYCH. 47, 48 (2004).
194. See generally supra note 188.
195. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 148 (D. Conn. 2006).
196. See Larry F. Jetmore, Assessment Center Promotional Testing,
http://www.policeone.com/police-jobs/articles/2083870POLICEONE.COM,
Assessment-center-promotional-testing (last accessed Feb. 26, 2012).
197. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 149.
198. Jetmore, supra note 196.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Achieving Success Through the Promotional Process: An Introduction to
the Fire Service Assessment Center Process, Slideshow Presentation of the El
Paso Fire Department (2008), http://www.ci.el-paso.tx.us/fire/_documents
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presents the scenario to four assessors, discussing and
justifying her actions and decisions.202
Many conclude the assessment center method most
closely approximates real-life behavior because it focuses on
relevant job-related simulations.203
In just about every
profession, there are some individuals who grasp the esoteric
knowledge of the business, and others who manifest a
supreme ability to practice it, and they are not always the
same people.204 Relying on a standardized test for fire or
police department promotions merely exacerbates the life or
death consequences of such a practice. While one might know
whether to park the truck “uptown or downtown,” that does
not mean that she knows—looking up at a building full of
smoke, but short on exits—the fastest way to carry one’s
family to safety.205 Conversely, an assessment center test
measures a candidate’s capability to impact and influence
others, resolve conflict situations, project professional
proficiency during task performance, demonstrate inherent
and learned leadership skills, and project one’s leadership
style authoritatively.206
Further, those departments employing assessment center
tests without resorting to a racially adverse method of
selecting those who they ultimately promote from the results
see a dearth of litigious challenges.207 While it is difficult to
settle on one reason for this, it is likely because participants

/An%20Introduction%20To%20The%20Fire%20Service%20Assessment%20Cent
er.pdf (“You are Battalion Chief on B7. P41 arrives on scene and reports heavy
smoke and fire involving two mobile home residential structures. They indicate
that they are making an initial ‘quick attack’ on the Division B structure. You
are second on the scene and observe two structures fully involved with
occupants and neighbors frantically helping P41. Residential structures on
Divisions B and D are being exposed to heat, fire and smoke.”).
202. Id.
203. JOHN L. COLEMAN, POLICE ASSESSMENT TESTING: AN ASSESSMENT
CENTER HANDBOOK FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 6 (4th ed. 2010).
204. See id. at 8 (“Most police officers can identify an acquaintance who
appears to possess a superior intelligence or knowledge level but can’t seem to
translate that know-how into performance as a supervisor.”).
205. See id. at 7 (“Organizational police management is beginning to realize
that its most performance-skilled or productive workers will not always be the
better person to promote into a leadership position. The value of the
assessment process is that it takes these employees and placed them in an
actual work-simulated situation to test their performance.”).
206. Id. at 14.
207. Id. at 35.
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recognize that the assessment center provides a fair
opportunity to demonstrate their skills and abilities.208 In
addition, participants accept the process as fair and relevant
because each person performs in situations similar to those
they will actually confront when promoted.209
VII. PROPOSAL: CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND TITLE VII
Standardized testing pervades nearly every walk of life
and serves as a litmus test for obtaining gainful employment,
Naturally, mechanically
among many other pursuits.210
applying standardized test results to a diverse group of
applicants whose scores reflect culturally inherent score
variations will have the result, intended or not, of favoring
some races over others. Therefore, if Congress still embraces
the purpose of Title VII it expounded when passing the 1991
amendment to the Civil Rights Act,211 it should amend Title
VII, adopting the following language:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate
impact is established where (a) a complaining party
demonstrates that an employer certifies the results of a
particular test or examination that causes a disparate
impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, and (b) such results can reasonably be assumed
to follow from the discriminatory effects of the creation or
administration of the exam, or (c) the employer is aware,
or should be aware, of reasonable alternative(s) to that
test or examination that would produce less disparate
results.

A. Certifying the Results
The administration of a promotional exam like the one in
Ricci follows a definable order: (Step 1) research how the
exam will be administered; (Step 2) create the exam; (Step 3)
determine how it will be graded or weighted; (Step 4)
determine how many promotions are available; (Step 5) issue
the requirements or instructions for the exam to those
208. Id. at 7.
209. Id.
210. See Mike Littwin, GOP Sympathy Card: Jack of Hypocrisy,
DENVERPOST.COM (July 17, 2009, 1:00AM), http://www.denverpost.com/
littwin/ci_12856807; see also Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in
“General Ability” Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1157, 1158 (1991).
211. See supra Part I.E.
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interested in applying; (Step 6) administer the exam; (Step 7)
analyze the results; (Step 8) certify the results; (Step 9) use
the results to award promotions.212
While the Supreme Court in Ricci took exception to the
fact that the city’s actions to adjust the outcome of the exam
occurred after its administration,213 this contradicted previous
federal decisions.
Circuit and district courts have
consistently upheld the actions of cities to change the test
before its administration in order to accommodate minority
applicants (Step 2).214 The Supreme Court itself upheld the
action of the Santa Clara County Transportation Authority
when it circumvented its own test results to promote a female
road dispatcher over a male one with a higher score (Step
9).215 This is the latest in the process a city could intervene in
order to ensure equal hiring opportunities, but the Supreme
Court upheld the action as consistent with the Court’s
agreement that Congress preferred employers to self-regulate
under Title VII.216 As the Court observed then, it would be
“ironic indeed” if a law triggered by the need to address the
country’s concern over centuries of racial injustice and
intended to improve the lot of those who suffered as a result,
was subsequently used to prohibit voluntary, race-conscious
efforts to address it.217
By imposing the “strong basis in evidence” standard on
employers who attempt to do exactly that, however,218 the
Supreme Court clearly no longer fears such an irony.
Therefore, Congress should amend the statute via clause (a)
212. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Conn.
2006).
213. Ricci III, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009).
214. See, e.g., Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 50–51 (1999)
(“[D]esigning the police officers’ entrance exam to mitigate the negative impact
on minority candidates . . . does not demonstrate that the County designed the
. . . exam because of some desire to adversely affect [white and Latino
applicants].”); see also Carrabus v. Schneider, 119 F. Supp. 2d 221, 226
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that designing exam to generate higher numbers of
minority candidates in the top levels of grading lists insufficient to establish
county was motivated by a desire to adversely affect white applicants).
215. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 642 (1987).
216. Id. at 630 (“[V]oluntary employer action can play a crucial role in
furthering Title VII’s purpose of eliminating the effects of discrimination in the
workplace, and . . . Title VII should not be read to thwart such efforts.”).
217. Id. at 645 (quoting Local No. 93 Intern. Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 516 (1986)).
218. Ricci III, 129 S. Ct. at 2677.
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in order to clarify that employers may intervene even when
tests have already been administered if the result of such an
action treats all applicants similarly, i.e., that the results not
certified are the results of all applicants, not just the test
results of one race. It is a contradiction to allow employers to
alter how test results will be interpreted or scored so that
more minority candidates may be promoted, but not allow
them to refuse certifying the results when such an action
poses a less discriminatory effect, such as when the results of
all applicants are discarded. Clause (a) protects such nondiscriminatory post-exam actions taken by employers to
ensure fair administration of its promotional procedures.
B. A Presumption of Discrimination
Clause (b) of the new statute is intended to send a
message to the Court that its “strong basis in evidence”
standard circumvents the intent of Congress when it passed
the 1991 revisions to the Civil Rights Act. If Congress had
desired such a strict plaintiff’s burden for proving disparate
impact when it passed the 1991 amendment, it could have
done so, instead of embracing the Griggs reasoning and thus
placing the burden on the employer of demonstrating
“business necessity” and “job relatedness.”219 Clause (b) is
also more consistent with the EEOC’s own guidelines, which
warn employers that disparate impact plaintiffs may prove a
prima facie case of discrimination via the certification of test
results demonstrating a violation of its four-fifths rule.220 A
“strong basis in evidence” standard does not just circumvent
this presumption but places the employer in a position of
uncertainty. While the four-fifths rule is quite simple to
apply, the Court made no effort to describe exactly what a
strong basis in evidence is, let alone how to apply it.221
C. Responsibility to Utilize Reasonable Alternatives
Finally, clause (c) clarifies the evidence of a reasonable
alternative required to demonstrate disparate impact. As
previously noted, the city in Ricci stood as somewhat of a
219. See supra Part I.E.
220. See supra Part I.D.
221. See generally Ricci III, 129 S. Ct. at 2675–81 (introducing the “strong
basis in evidence” standard and ruling the City of New Haven did not meet it
without ever suggesting steps it could have taken to do so).
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straw man for the Court since it did not put forth the best
possible case, especially when it came to researching a
The
reasonable alternative to standardized testing.222
majority dismissed this part of the city’s argument, especially
when it came to the administration of an assessment center
approach.223 The Court noted that Dr. Hornick’s “brief
mention of alternative testing methods, standing alone, does
not [demonstrate] assessment centers were available to the
city at the time of the examinations and that they would have
produced a less adverse impact.”224
While the Court may quickly dispatch the city’s less than
exemplary showing of reasonable alternatives, clause (c)
allows a complainant, or an employer taking a proactive
approach, to demonstrate such alternatives do exist with a
reasonable amount of evidence. For example, one would need
to demonstrate that neighboring employers experience less
disparate results based on a different, although well-known
employment exam that is equally valid. This way, the burden
of production demonstrating such alternatives does not
become one where parties need demonstrate overwhelming
proof of less adverse impact, or no adverse impact of
alternative tests. Both of those standards would make it so
difficult for disparate impact plaintiffs, few would survive
summary judgment, despite the fact they bring otherwise
strong cases.
CONCLUSION
Since Ricci, the Court has continued its assault on Title
VII disparate impact. Its rationale in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes225 may further blockade the courthouse door from
disparate impact claimants, at least in the class action
context. The Court concluded that female employees failed to
establish the existence of a common question to certify its
class claiming sex discrimination at Wal-Mart.226 The Court
held that such claims may only proceed to trial by
222. See supra Part V.A; supra note 142.
223. Ricci III, 129 S. Ct. at 2680.
224. Id.
225. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
226. Id. at 2552. In order to certify a class of plaintiffs under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, there must be “questions of law or fact common to the
class . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
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demonstrating “some glue” holding together the alleged
reasons for the employer’s various decisions to hire or not
hire, or promote or not promote all the class members.227
Depending on where the Court demands to see the “glue”
it mentions, it could decide that plaintiffs could not attack a
standardized employment exam as a class because they could
not demonstrate each individual’s performance on the exam
was the result of stereotype threat, or some other cause
common to the entire class. In that case, the Court could
decide that individual assessments of test performance will
outweigh the benefits of class treatment.
While the Court held that employees “clearly would
satisfy” the commonality and typicality requirements for class
actions under the Federal Rules by demonstrating that
employers use a biased testing procedure,228 it also expressed
deep skepticism for the “social framework” research of
plaintiff’s sociological expert, Dr. William Bielby, who
testified that Wal-Mart had a “strong corporate culture”
making it vulnerable to gender bias.229 Because Dr. Bielby
could not specify how regularly stereotypes played a
meaningful role in employment decisions at Wal-Mart, the
Court could “safely disregard what he ha[d] to say.”230
This treatment of Dr. Bielby’s research bore a striking
resemblance to the majority’s treatment of Dr. Helms in
Ricci,231 in that the Court simply dismissed the findings so it
never needed to appreciate the sociological consequences of
them in light of its later decision. It is difficult to see how a
plaintiff’s expert explaining stereotype threat to the Court
would fair any better.
Ricci v. DeStefano is not the first time the Supreme Court
attempted to circumvent the obvious intent of Title VII.232
Such end runs around the statute have in the past been met
with legislative rebuke.233 If Congress still wants to protect
“flexibility in modifying employment systems and practices to

227. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552.
228. Id. at 2553 (quoting the Court’s decision in Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457
U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982)). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
229. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553.
230. Id. at 2554.
231. See supra Part V.B.
232. See supra Part I.D.
233. See supra Part I.E.
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comport with the purposes of [T]itle VII,”234 and encourage
and protect voluntary action to improve opportunities for
minorities “in order to carry out the Congressional intent
embodied in [T]itle VII,”235 then the time has come to clarify
Title VII once again.
Congress should amend the statute, making it an
unlawful employment practice to certify the results of a test
that causes a disparate impact when those results reasonably
follow from the discriminatory effects of the creation or
administration of the exam, or the employer is aware, or
should be aware, of a reasonable alternative to the test that
produces less disparate results.

234. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c) (2010).
235. Id.

